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Published in BENTON E. GUP, ED., TOO-BIG-TO-FAIL: POLICIES AND PRACTICES IN GOVERNMENT BAILOUTS (Quorum Books, Greenwood Publishing Group, 2003)DOES FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION INCREASE  THE LIKELIHOOD OF A SYSTEMIC BANKING CRISIS?  EVIDENCE FROM THE PAST THREE DECADES AND THE GREAT DEPRESSIONArthur E. Wilmarth, Jr.IntroductionOver the past three decades, leading industrial nations and many developing countrieshave liberalized their financial markets by (i) removing foreign exchange controls, (ii) deregulating interest rates paid on bank deposits, (iii) expanding the powers of domestic financialinstitutions, and (iv) creating greater opportunities for entry by foreign banks.  Unquestionably,the deregulation of domestic and global financial markets has produced major benefits, includingmore efficient intermediation of financial resources, more rapid economic development andfaster growth in trade.  However, banking crises have occurred with increasing frequency ininternational markets since 1973, and many crises have taken place in countries that deregulatedtheir financial markets.  This apparent linkage between deregulation and banking crises indicatesthat financial liberalization may have a “dark side,” because it tends to produce a banking systemthat is more vulnerable to systemic risk.  Several recent studies indicate that banking crises associated with deregulation occur in seven general stages.  First, financial liberalization broadens the lending powers and permissibleinvestments of banks, and deregulation also places greater competitive pressures on banks.  As aresult, banks have incentives to increase their profits by expanding their lending commitmentsand equity investments in the real estate and securities markets.  Second, the expanded
2availability of debt and equity financing produces an economic “boom.”  Boom conditions arefueled by positive feedback between rising asset values and the willingness of creditors andinvestors to provide additional financing based on their belief that asset values will continue torise.  Third, asset markets ultimately “overshoot” and reach levels that cannot be justified byeconomic “fundamentals” (e.g., the cash flow produced by real estate projects and businessventures).  Fourth, the asset boom becomes a “bust” when investors and creditors (1) realize thatmarket prices for real estate and securities have diverged from economic fundamentals, and (2)engage in a panicked rush to liquidate their investments and collect their loans.  Fifth, the asset bust creates adverse macroeconomic effects, because it (A) impairs theliquidity and market value of assets held as investments or pledged as collateral for loans, and(B) discourages investors and creditors from making new investments or extending additionalloans, thereby depressing economic activity and reducing the ability of borrowers to pay theirdebts.  Sixth, the continuing fall in asset values and rise in nonperforming loans inflict largelosses on many banks.  Those losses impair the confidence of depositors and threaten a systemiccrisis in the banking sector.  Seventh, to prevent such a crisis, governmental authorities spendmassive sums to protect depositors and recapitalize banks.  In sum, deregulated financial markets generally promote faster growth rates by providingmore extensive financing to consumers and business firms during economic expansions. However, by encouraging a greater reliance on external funding, deregulation creates a higherrisk that consumers and firms will become overextended and insolvent if external fundingsources shut down during economic contractions.  Thus, financial liberalization tends to amplifythe business cycle, and it therefore creates a difficult tradeoff between (1) the important policy
1  For discussion of lessons to be drawn from the apparent correlation between financialliberalization and economic crises since the early 1970's, see, e.g., Ben Bernanke & MarkGertler, “Monetary Policy and Asset Price Volatility,” 84 Economic Review No. 4 (Fed. Res.Bank of K.C., MO), 4th Qtr. 1999, at 17, 17-21; Claudio Borio & Philip Lowe, “Asset Prices,Financial and Monetary Stability: Exploring the Nexus,” Bank for Int’l Settlements WorkingPaper No. 114, July 2002 (available at <www.bis.org>); E.P. Davis, Debt, Financial Fragility,and Systemic Risk 152-278 (Clarendon Press, 1992); Int’l Monetary Fund, World EconomicOutlook, May 2000: Asset Prices and the Business Cycle (available at <www.imf.org>)[hereinafter cited as 2000 IMF World Economic Outlook], ch. 3; Luc Laeven, Daniela Klingebiel& Randy Kroszner, “Financial Crises, Financial Dependence, and Industry Growth,” World BankPolicy Working Paper 2855, June 2002 (available at <http://econ.worldbank.org>); Hal S. Scott& Philip A. Wellons, International Finance: Transactions, Policy and Regulation 12-32(Foundation Press, 8th ed. 2001). 3
goal of creating better conditions for economic expansion and (2) the equally important objective of minimizing the risk of a severe economic downturn.1 Part I of this article considers evidence that financial liberalization has increased thelikelihood of systemic banking crises since the early 1970's.  Particular attention is given to theJapanese banking crisis of the 1990's, the U.S. banking and thrift crisis of 1980-92, and thepotential threat to banks posed by the boom-and-bust cycle in U.S. securities markets during1996-2002.  Part II describes the expansion of bank involvement in the U.S. real estate andsecurities markets during the 1920's, and the apparent links between the collapse of thosemarkets and the systemic banking crisis of the Great Depression.  The concluding section offerssome general observations about the evidence presented in Parts I and II.    I. Financial Liberalization and Banking Crises since the 1970'sA. Banking Crises in International Markets In the early 1970's, the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates, together with dramatic increases in energy prices, brought an end to the postwar period ofrelative stability in global financial markets.  By the late 1970's, advances in information
2  For discussion of the links between deregulation, asset price booms and crises ininternational financial markets since the 1970's, see, e.g., Roberto Chang & Andres Velasco, “AModel of Financial Crises in Emerging Markets,” 116 Quarterly Journal of Economics 489(2001); Davis, supra note 1, at 216-41, 256-73; Benton E. Gup, ed., International Banking Crisespassim (Quorum Books: Greenwood Pub. Group, Inc. 1999); Ari Hyytinen, “The Time Profile ofRisk in Banking Crises: Evidence from Scandinavian Banking Sectors,” 12 Applied FinancialEconomics 613 (2002); George G. Kaufman, “Banking and Currency Crises and Systemic Risk:Lessons from Recent Events,” Economic Perspectives (Fed. Res. Bank of Chi., IL), 3d Qtr. 2000,at 9 [hereinafter cited as Kaufman, “Banking Crises”]; Henry Kaufman, On Money and Markets:4
technology and the creation of innovative financial instruments (including securitized debt and“junk bonds”) were undermining legal and institutional barriers that separated banks fromnonbank financial intermediaries in many countries.  Over the next two decades, governmentofficials in both developed and developing countries progressively deregulated their bankingsystems by abandoning foreign exchange controls, tearing down geographic barriers to entry andremoving restrictions on mergers and product diversification.  The competitive forces unleashed by innovation and deregulation created financialmarkets that were dynamic and more efficient, but also more interdependent, volatile and fragile. As a consequence, international markets have witnessed a series of financial crises since 1973. More than 130 countries encountered serious banking problems during 1980-96, and East Asiaand Russia experienced devastating banking crises in 1997-98.  In many nations, financial crisesoccurred in conjunction with a boom-and-bust cycle in the general economy.  In reviewing suchcrises, analysts frequently concluded that a poorly-supervised deregulation of the banking sectorhad encouraged financial institutions to pursue aggressive lending and investment policies,thereby creating an unsustainable economic boom.  In many cases, a rapid growth in financingwas linked to speculative valuations of illiquid assets (e.g., real estate and corporate securities)that banks used for investments or as collateral for loans.2
A Wall Street Memoir (McGraw-Hill, 2000) [hereinafter cited as Kaufman, On Money andMarkets], at 46-83, 122-35, 242-46, 287-321; Carl-Johan Lindgren et al., Bank Soundness andMacroeconomic Policy passim (Int’l Monetary Fund, 1996); Ronnie J. Phillips & Richard D.Johnson, “Regulating International Banking: Rationale, History, and Future Prospects,” inBenton E. Gup, ed., The New Financial Architecture: Banking Regulation in the 21st Century(Quorum Books: Greenwood Pub. Group, 2000), at 1, 1-8; Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., “How ShouldWe Respond to the Growing Risks of Financial Conglomerates?”, in Patricia A. McCoy, ed.,Financial Modernization after Gramm-Leach-Bliley (LexisNexis Group, 2002), at 65, 68-70, 85-90; 2000 IMF World Economic Outlook, supra note 1, at 77-78, 91-107.  
3   See, e.g., Hyytinen, supra note 1, at 613, 616-17; Kaufman, “Banking Crises,” supranote 1, at 11-18; Allan H. Meltzer, “Back to Bailouts,” Wall Street Journal, Aug. 7, 2002, atA14; Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., “The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services Industry,1975-2000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks,” 2002 University of Illinois LawReview 215 [hereinafter cited as Wilmarth, “Transformation”], at 308-11.  See also Charles A.E.Goodhart, The Central Bank and the Financial System 350-410 (1995) (finding, based on ananalysis of 104 major bank failures in international markets during 1973-93, that governmentalauthorities (i) provided financial assistance or arranged mergers to rescue 73 of those bankswithout any loss to depositors, and (ii) protected all or most of the depositors in 20 of the 31remaining cases). 5
Numerous countries incurred losses ranging from 4-40% of their gross domestic product(“GDP”) in coping with financial disruptions.  For example, the governments of Finland,Indonesia, Japan, Mexico, Norway, South Korea, Sweden and Thailand responded to systemicbanking crises by protecting all depositors against loss, and they also spent massive amounts torecapitalize major banks during the 1990's.  Mexico and South Korea each committed $100billion or more for this purpose, while Japan has spent or budgeted $550 billion to support itsdeeply troubled banking system.  The International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) assisted  many ofthese bank rescue programs.  During the 1990's, the IMF and its member nations supplied $250billion of assistance to debtor countries, including programs totaling $145 billion for Indonesia,Mexico and South Korea.3        Japan’s banking troubles since 1990 provide a particularly striking example of the
6apparent linkage between financial deregulation, asset booms, banking crises and impairedmacroeconomic performance.  In the last half of the 1980's, the Bank of Japan’s lax monetarypolicy fostered a large increase in bank lending that produced a “bubble economy.”  Creditexpansion led to rapid increases in market values for Japanese real estate and securities, which inturn encouraged banks to make further loans based on speculative valuations of land and stockused as collateral.  Japanese banks also built up huge portfolios of corporate shares, due to theirdesire to profit from the booming stock market and to maintain strong cross-shareholdingrelationships with nonbank firms that were members of the banks’ keiretsu (corporate groups). Japanese banks had two additional incentives to make real estate loans and equity investments. First, real estate loans helped to offset a decline in corporate lending that occurred when financialliberalization enabled large Japanese companies to obtain credit through the Japanese bondmarket and the Eurobond market.  Second, Japanese regulators and the Basel Capital Accord of1988 permitted Japanese banks to use unrealized capital gains from their stock portfolios tosatisfy a significant portion of their capital requirements.  The Bank of Japan tightened its monetary policy significantly in 1990 to discouragefurther expansion of the “bubble economy.”  In response to more restrictive credit conditions, theJapanese real estate and stock markets both collapsed in the early 1990's, with values in eachsector falling by more than two-thirds.  Two of the twenty largest Japanese banks failed, andseveral other major banks were driven to the brink of insolvency.  Two major securities firms andthree large insurance companies also failed.  By the fall of 2002, Japanese banks had written offmore than $600 billion of nonperforming loans, but private sector analysts estimated that thebanks’ remaining bad debts still exceeded $1 trillion.  Japanese banks also held severely
4  For discussion of Japan’s “bubble economy” and its resulting financial crisis, see, e.g.,Alan Ahearne et al., “Preventing Deflation: Lessons from Japan’s Experience in the 1990s,” Int’lFinance Discussion Paper No. 729, Bd. of Governors of Fed. Res. Sys., June 2002 (available at<www.federalreserve.gov>); Tamim Bayoumi & Charles Collyns, eds., Post-Bubble Blues: HowJapan Responded to Asset Price Collapse passim (Int’l Monetary Fund, 2000); Lynn E. Browne,“Does Japan Offer Any Lessons for the United States?”, 2001 New England Economic ReviewNo. 3 (Fed. Res. Bank of Boston, MA), at 3; Allan D. Brunner & Steven B. Kamin, “BankLending and Economic Activity in Japan: Did ‘Financial Factors’ Contribute to the RecentDownturn?”, 3 International Journal of Finance and Economics 73 (1998); Takeo Hoshi & AnilKashyap, “The Japanese Banking Crisis: Where Did It Come from and How Will It End?”, inBen Bernanke, ed., 1999 NBER Macroeconomics Annual 129; Wilmarth, “Transformation,”supra note 3, at 308, 451-53.  For analysis of Japan’s continuing economic and financialproblems in the autumn of 2002, see, e.g., Ken Belson, “A Sick Banking System ResistsTherapy,” New York Times, Oct. 29, 2002, at C1; James Brooke, “Fears of a Hard LandingRattle Tokyo,” New York Times, Oct. 10, 2002, at W1; Akio Mikuni & R. Taggart Murphy,“Trapped in Japan’s Bank Crisis,” New York Times, Oct. 29, 2002, at A31; Adam Posen, “ForJapan, It’s Every Which Way but Back,” Washington Post, Oct. 20, 2002, at B5.7
depreciated stock portfolios that impaired their ability to satisfy capital requirements.  Japan’sgovernment failed to revive the economy after spending more than $1 trillion on economicstimulus programs.  The government also failed to restore the financial system despite spending$200 billion and budgeting an additional $350 billion to support Japanese banks.  Japan’s banking crisis has crippled the Japanese economy in two ways.  First, banks havebeen reluctant to collect or charge off loans owed by failing companies, because aggressivecollection efforts would trigger a wave of corporate bankruptcies, and the required charge-offswould seriously erode the capital of many banks.  Second, the banks’ huge burden ofuncollectible debts has undermined their ability and willingness to make new loans to viableJapanese businesses.  The Japanese government’s financial capacity to resolve the crisisremained doubtful in the autumn of 2002, because Japan was already saddled with a huge publicsector debt burden that exceeded 150% of its GDP.4    B. U.S. Banking and Thrift Crises during 1980-92 
8The banking and thrift industries in the United States were severely shaken during the1980's and early 1990's by a systemic crisis that was associated with deregulation and a boom-and-bust cycle in the U.S. economy.  Beginning in 1980, federal and state governments greatlyexpanded the real estate lending powers of banks and thrifts.  Federal and state officialsencouraged consolidation by liberalizing geographic restrictions on branching and relaxingantitrust rules governing mergers.  Federal and state officials also permitted thrifts to make largeinvestments in junk bonds, commercial real estate projects and a wide array of other ventures. Nor did federal regulators object when banks made extensive loans to energy producers andcorporations engaged in leveraged buyouts (“LBOs”).  Legislators and regulators believed that deregulation would help banks and thrifts toovercome a significant erosion that was occurring in their traditional lending businesses. Corporate borrowers increasingly bypassed banks by selling commercial paper and issuing junkbonds in the credit markets.  At the same time, inflation and securitization created a residentialmortgage market that was more competitive, more volatile and less profitable for thrifts. Government officials concluded that deregulation would enable banks and thrifts to modernizetheir operations and “grow out of their problems.”  Congress expanded deposit insurancecoverage from $40,000 to $100,000 per depositor, while federal deposit insurers charged flat-ratepremiums that failed to take account of the risk profile of each insured institution.  Due to thelow-cost funding opportunities provided by flat-rate deposit insurance and a nationwide networkof deposit brokers, aggressive banks and thrifts had strong incentives to use insured deposits tofinance their risky loans and investments. In combination, deregulation and financial innovation produced a rapid expansion of
9private sector credit for real estate development, energy production, LBO transactions and othercorporate takeovers.  Between 1980 and 1989, outstanding junk bonds increased from $30 billionto $210 billion, and junk bonds’ share of the corporate debt market grew from 13% to 27%. During the same period, nonfinancial corporate debt rose by $1.6 trillion, and real estatedevelopers obtained financing to build more than $1 trillion of commercial projects.  Bank lending to business firms and real estate developers more than doubled during the 1980's, whilethrift lending to such borrowers expanded at a comparable rate until 1986.  By 1990, banks heldabout $250 billion of commercial real estate loans and $150 billion of LBO loans, while thriftsheld more than $100 billion of commercial real estate loans and $12 billion of junk bonds.   The real estate, energy production and LBO markets all collapsed by the end of the1980's, with devastating consequences for banks, thrifts and the U.S. economy.  During 1980-94,U.S. regulators spent almost $200 billion of deposit insurance funds and taxpayer revenues toresolve the failures of 2,900 banks and thrifts, which collectively held more than $900 billion ofassets.  U.S. officials protected all insured depositors in failed banks and thrifts, and they alsoprotected uninsured depositors and payments system creditors in several “too big to fail”(“TBTF”) banks that failed or were threatened with failure during 1980-92.  Some of the mostaggressive and fastest-growing banks and thrifts of the 1980's (e.g., Bank of New England,Continental Illinois Bank, First City, First RepublicBank, CenTrust Savings, Imperial Savingsand Lincoln Savings) became prominent casualties by the end of the decade.  Regulators alsogranted extensive forbearance to some very large troubled banks, including Bank of America andCiticorp.  The banking and thrift crises of the 1980's produced a prolonged “credit crunch” that had
5  For discussions of the causes and consequences of the banking and thrift crises of the1980's and early 1990's, see, e.g., Edward Chancellor, Devil Take the Hindmost: A History ofFinancial Speculation 255-82 (1999); Kaufman, On Money and Markets, supra note 1, at 273-81,347-49; L. William Seidman, Full Faith and Credit: The Great S&L Debacle and OtherWashington Sagas 139-97, 229-39 (Times Books: Random House, 1993); Wilmarth,“Transformation,” supra note 3, at 313-16, 327-28, 355-57, 412; Federal Deposit InsuranceCorp., History of the Eighties: Lessons for the Future (1997), Vol. I, at 137-88, 235-54, 291-378. For narrative descriptions of major bank failures, and for data regarding bank and thrift failuresand resolution costs during 1980-94, see Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., Managing the Crisis:The FDIC and RTC Experience 509-704, 794-99, 807-09, 860-63 (1998).  10
significant adverse effects on U.S. economic growth during the early 1990's.  Bank and thriftfailures disrupted credit relationships with many borrowers.  Surviving institutions weregenerally reluctant to extend new loans until they had repaired their balance sheets and theeconomy had shown clear signs of recovery from the recession of 1990-91.  Bank lending tobusinesses and real estate developers declined in each year during 1990-92, and did not show anysignificant recovery until 1994.5C. The Recent Boom-and-Bust Cycle in U.S. Securities Markets  During the 1990's, Congress and federal regulators adopted deregulatory measures thatencouraged large commercial banks to expand geographically and diversify their lines ofbusiness.  In 1994, for example, Congress removed all legal barriers to interstate bank mergersand acquisitions.  The new nationwide banking regime promoted a consolidation movement thatenabled the ten largest banks to increase their combined share of U.S. banking industry assetsfrom 26% to 49% during the 1990's.  In addition, by 1998 federal regulators and the courts hadallowed banks to make substantial inroads into the securities and insurance sectors by exploitingloopholes in two statutes – the Banking Act of 1933 (popularly known as the “Glass-SteagallAct”) and the Bank Holding Company Act (“BHC Act”) – that previously had been viewed as
6  In both 2000 and 2001, the foregoing nine institutions and Lehman Brothers were thetop-ranked global underwriters of stocks and bonds.  See “2001 Underwriting Rankings: GlobalStocks and Bonds,” Wall Street Journal, Jan. 2, 2002, at R19 (also showing that those 10institutions accounted for 75% of all global underwriting proceeds in 2000-01).  For a discussionof the consolidation of the U.S. banking industry and the entry of U.S. and foreign banks into thesecurities and insurance businesses during the 1990's, see Wilmarth, “Transformation,” supranote 3, at 225-27, 250-56, 318-32, 418-21, 427-28, 438-50.11
strong legal barriers to bank entry into the securities and insurance fields.  Congress ratified thisdiversification of banking powers when it passed the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (“GLBAct”), which authorized banks to affiliate with securities firms and insurance companies byestablishing financial holding companies.  In confirming this grant of “universal banking”powers to financial holding companies, the GLB Act repealed several provisions of the Glass-Steagall Act (“G-S Act”) and the BHC Act.  By the time Congress adopted the GLB Act, Citigroup, J.P. Morgan Chase and Bank ofAmerica had already established large investment banking operations that competed with the“big three” Wall Street firms (Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch and Morgan Stanley) and threemajor European universal banks (Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank and UBS).6  As domestic andforeign banks entered the securities business, they offered generous loan commitments to attractcustomers for securities underwriting and merger advisory work.  The major Wall Street firmsresponded by offering their own “package deals” that included lending, underwriting andadvisory services.  This fierce competition for investment banking clients fostered a hugeexpansion in debt and equity financing for business firms in the United States.  The annualvolume of syndicated loans rose from less than $400 million in 1993 to more than $1 trillion ineach year during 1997-2000.  Similarly, the annual volume of underwritten public offerings ofcorporate debt and equity securities grew from less than $900 billion in 1992 to more than $1.8
7  Emily Thornton et al., “The Breakdown in Banking,” Business Week, Oct. 7, 2002, at40 [hereinafter cited as Thornton et al., “Breakdown in Banking”], at 41; Wilmarth,“Transformation,” supra note 3, at 326-28, 378-81, 411-12; Securities Industry Ass’n, 2001Securities Industry Fact Book, at 12, 24-25.
8  Keith Athreya, “The Growth of Unsecured Credit: Are We Better Off?,” 87 EconomicReview No. 3 (Fed. Res. Bank of Richmond, VA), at 11, 11-15; Thornton et al., “Breakdown inBanking,” supra note 7, at 41; Wilmarth, “Transformation,” supra note 3, at 388-90.  Federalcourts have held that two federal statutes – 12 U.S.C. §§ 85 & 1831d – allow national banks andstate banks that are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) to “export”interest rates from any state in which they are “located” to borrowers residing in other states. Based on these decisions, large banks have avoided restrictive state usury laws by locating theirconsumer lending operations in states (e.g., Delaware and South Dakota) that are willing toattract those operations by abolishing all limitations on consumer lending rates. See MarquetteNational Bank v. First of Omaha Service Corp., 439 U.S. 299 (1978); Smiley v. Citibank (SouthDakota), N.A., 517 U.S. 735 (1996); Greenwood Trust Co. v. Massachusetts, 971 F.2d 818 (1stCir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1052 (1993). 12
trillion in each year during 1998-2000.7  A similar surge of debt financing occurred in the consumer sector.  Large banks,securities firms and finance companies created a nationwide market for securities backed by consumer debt.  The growth of securitized consumer credit accelerated after federal courts issueddecisions that effectively destroyed state-law limitations on maximum interest rates for consumerloans.  By 2002, commercial and investment banks had sold asset-backed securities representingsome $7 trillion of consumer debt.8 The competition for market-based financing among banks, securities firms and financecompanies has resulted in a dramatic increase in leverage and risk for both corporate andconsumer borrowers.  During 1990-2002, the outstanding debt of U.S. nonfinancial firms rosefrom $2.4 trillion to $4.9 trillion.  Outstanding junk bonds tripled during the same period andreached $600 billion.  During 1995-2001, total U.S. consumer debt (including home mortgageloans) grew from $4.5 trillion to $7.2 trillion.  Banks and nonbank lenders increasingly marketed
9  Carrick Mollenkamp, “Credit-Card Scrutiny Hits Lenders and Threatens to DampSpending,” Wall Street Journal, Aug. 19, 2002, at A1; Wilmarth, “Transformation,” supra note 3,at 232, 383-85, 392-96, Heather Timmons, “Surprise!  The Little Guy Loses,” Business Week,July 8, 2002, at 42; Gregory Zuckerman, “Debtor Nation: Borrowing Levels Reach a Record,Sparking Debate,” Wall Street Journal, July 15, 2000, at C1; “Dicing with debt,” Economist, Jan.26, 2002, at 22.  
10  Patrick Barta, “Signs of Strain: After Long Boom, Weaknesses Appear in HousingMarket,” Wall Street Journal, Oct. 3, 2002, at A1; Richard Cowden, “Large, Syndicated LoanProblems Rise,” 79 BNA’s Banking Report 599 (Oct. 14, 2002); Peter Coy et al., “ConsumerCredit: A Crunch May Be Coming,” Business Week, Aug. 12, 2002, at 32; Loretta J. Mester, “Isthe Personal Bankruptcy System Bankrupt?”, Business Review (Fed. Res. Bank of Phila., PA),1st Qtr. 2002, at 31, 33 (Figures 1 & 2); Thornton et al., “Breakdown in Banking,” supra note 7,at 41-42; Wilmarth, “Transformation,” supra note 3, at 382-85, 394-98.13
credit services to higher-risk “subprime” consumer borrowers, and those borrowers held a thirdof all credit card loans and a tenth of all home mortgages and home equity loans by 2002.  As aresult of this rapid growth in private sector credit, (i) U.S. corporate debt rose to record levels asa percentage of both GDP and corporate profits, and (ii) U.S. household debt exceeded annualhousehold income for the first time in postwar economic history.9Rising debt levels and a slowing U.S. economy have produced a sharp rise in troubledcorporate and consumer loans.  By 2002, a record $880 billion of corporate bonds were either in distress or in default, including 45% of all outstanding junk bonds.  The volume of syndicatedloans criticized by bank examiners rose to $240 billion, a fivefold increase since 1998. Delinquencies on consumer loans (including mortgage loans) reached their highest level since therecession of 1990-91.  Growing consumer debt burdens also produced a large increase inpersonal bankruptcy filings, which rose from 700,000 in 1990 to more than 1.3 million in eachyear during 1997-2001.10 The greatest excesses of the financing boom of the 1990's occurred in the information
11  For discussion of the rapid expansion and collapse of the telecom industry during1996-2002, see, e.g., Yochi J. Dreazen, “Behind the Fiber Glut: Telecom Carriers Were Drivenby Wildly Optimistic Data on Internet’s Growth,” Wall Street Journal, Sept. 26, 2002, at B1;14
technology (“high-tech”) and telecommunications (“telecom”) industries.  TheTelecommunications Act of 1996 and the implementing rules adopted by the FederalCommunications Commission deregulated the telecom industry and encouraged new firms toenter markets that had long been dominated by the regional Bell companies.  Banks, securitiesfirms and venture capital funds provided debt and equity financing to a myriad of high-tech andtelecom firms, including many unproven, start-up ventures.  During 1996-2001, the telecomindustry received $1.3 trillion in debt financing from syndicated loans and bond offerings, as wellas hundreds of billions of dollars in equity financing from initial public offerings (“IPOs”).  By2000, new entrants into the telecom business included 6,000 Internet providers, 250 localtelephone companies, and a half-dozen long distance carriers.  However, in early 2000 it became clear that these “new economy” firms would fall farshort of their optimistic forecasts for revenues and earnings, because they had created operatingcapacity that far exceeded customer demand.  For example, telecom firms installed millions ofmiles of fiber-optic cables with the expectation that Internet traffic would double every hundreddays.  Instead, Internet use grew at a much slower rate, and less than 3% of the installed fiber-optic lines were actually needed to meet customer demand.  As a result of this glut of excesscapacity, telecom firms suffered an estimated negative cash flow of $60 billion in 2000.  Whenmarket participants realized the magnitude of the telecom industry’s problems, they rapidly soldoff shares of high-tech and telecom companies, and the debt and equity markets virtually shutdown for those firms.11  Investors similarly dumped the stocks of large energy companies that had
Remarks by Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board (“FRB”), “World Financeand Risk Management,” Sept. 25, 2002 (available at <www.federalreserve.gov>) [hereinaftercited as Greenspan, “Risk Management”]; Steven Pearlstein, “Fiber-Optic Overdose Racks UpCasualties,” Washington Post, May 2, 2002, at A1; Steve Rosenbush & Heather Timmons,“Telecom Lenders: Standing in Line for What?”, Business Week, Feb. 11, 2002, at 62; Jacob M.Schlesinger, “The Deregulators: Did Washington Help Set Stage for Current BusinessTurmoil?”, Wall Street Journal, Oct. 17, 2002, at A1; Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., “ControllingSystemic Risk in an Era of Financial Consolidation,” in Roy C. Baban, ed., CurrentDevelopments in Monetary and Financial Law (Int’l Monetary Fund, 2003), Vol. 3 (forthcoming)[hereinafter cited as Wilmarth, “Systemic Risk”), Part II(C)(3)(a); Special report: The telecomscrisis: Too many debts; too few calls, Economist, July 20, 2002, at 59.
12  Peter Behr, Dynegy Ends Power-Trading Operations, Washington Post, Oct. 17, 2002,at E1; Schlesinger, supra note 11; Energy trading: Prepare to be shocked, Economist, May 18,2002.
13  Anthony Bianco, “The Angry Market,” Business Week, July 25, 2002, at 32; E.S.Browning, “Industrials Fall to 4-Year Low, Close Below 7600,” Wall Street Journal, Oct. 1,2002, at C1; Greenspan, “Risk Management,” supra note 11; Joseph Nocera et al., “SystemFailure: Corporate America Has Lost Its Way,” Fortune, June 24, 2002, at 62. 15
aggressively expanded their energy trading operations after federal and state agencies deregulatedenergy markets in the 1990's.12     The collapse of high-tech and telecom stock prices triggered a broad downturn in U.S.equity markets during 2001-02.  Investors manifested a general loss of confidence, due in part tostunning disclosures of fraudulent financial reporting and other serious misconduct at some ofthe most glamorous corporate “stars” of the 1990's (e.g., Adelphia, Enron, Global Crossing,Qwest, Tyco and WorldCom).  Between March 2000 and September 2002, the NASDAQ marketindex (representing primarily the stocks of high-tech and telecom firms) fell by more than three-quarters, while the broader S&P 500 index declined by almost one-half.  In the process, investorslost an estimated $8 trillion in paper wealth.13  Like their U.S. counterparts, European equity markets experienced a prolonged slump in
14  E.g., James C. Cooper & Kathleen Madigan, “Business Outlook: Why this RecoveryFeels Like a Recession,” Business Week, Oct. 28, 2002, at 31; Craig Karman, “Stock MarketQuarterly Review: Led by U.S. Tribulations, Third Quarter Held More Pain for World Markets,”Wall Street Journal, Oct. 1, 2002, at C13; Pam Woodall, “The unfinished recession: A survey ofthe world economy,” Economist, Sept. 28, 2002 (following p. 52); “Europe’s tumblingstockmarkets: Feeling for the floor,” Economist, Sept. 28, 2002, at 67. 
15  See Robert J. Shiller, Irrational Exuberance (Princeton Univ. Press, 2000) (quotingAlan Greenspan’s statement that the U.S. stock market exhibited “irrational exuberance” in late1996, id. at 3, and offering reasons for the excessive optimism of investors during the “mostdramatic bull market in U.S. history,” id. at 5); Federal Reserve Board’s Semiannual MonetaryPolicy Report to the Congress: Testimony of FRB Chairman Alan Greenspan before the SenateCommittee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, July 16, 2002 (available at<www.federalreserve.gov>), at 5 (stating that “corporate governance checks and balances” brokedown during the late 1990's because “the rapid enlargement of stock market capitalizations . . .arguably engendered an outsized increase in opportunities for avarice” and thereby fostered an“infectious greed [that] seemed to grip much of our business community”).  For evidence that aspeculative “bubble” existed in the U.S. stock market in early 2000, which could not be justifiedby economic fundamentals, see, e.g., Shiller, supra, at 5-16, 183-93; 2000 IMF World EconomicOutlook, supra note 1, at 79-88, 110-12.  For evidence that conflicts of interest impaired theobjectivity and reliability of securities analysts, public accounting firms and credit rating16
2000-02.  The end of the high-tech and telecom booms created economic hardships for a widerange of companies on both sides of the Atlantic.  The U.S. economy struggled through arecession and a slow recovery, while economic growth in the European Union ground to a virtualhalt.  In both the U.S. and Europe, the prospects for a strong economic recovery appeared verydoubtful in late 2002.  Observers concluded that the surge of debt and equity financing in  thelate 1990's had created significant problems with overcapacity in many economic sectors.14 The bursting of the stock market “bubble” in 2000-02 has been blamed on a variety offactors, including (i) “irrational exuberance” that impaired the judgment of too many investors,(ii) “infectious greed” that tempted too many corporate executives, and (iii) conflicts of interestthat undermined the effectiveness of too many outside monitors of corporate performance,including public accountants, securities analysts and credit rating agencies.15  This article will
agencies during the late 1990's, see, e.g., Wilmarth, “Systemic Risk,” supra note 11, PartII(C)(2); “Financial Oversight of Enron: The SEC and Private-Sector Watchdogs,” Report of theStaff of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Oct. 8. 2002 [hereinafter cited as SenatePrivate-Sector Watchdog Report], at 26-28, 69-127.  17
focus on allegations that large commercial and investment banks promoted transactions thatinvolved excessive risks to investors, the financial system and the broader economy.By the autumn of 2002, government officials and private litigants had filed legal claimsasserting that the following financial institutions had committed serious misconduct:•       Citigroup, J.P. Morgan Chase (“Chase”) and Merrill Lynch allegedly helped Enron’sfraudulent reporting schemes by entering into prepaid commodity forward transactions withEnron and with offshore entities that were established and controlled by the banks.  These three-party derivatives contracts allegedly provided $8 billion of debt financing to Enron but wererecorded on Enron’s financial statements as commodity trades, thereby materially understatingEnron’s debt and overstating its trading revenues.•       During 1997-2000, Citigroup’s Salomon Smith Barney unit became the leadinginvestment bank for the telecom industry.  During this period, Citigroup earned an estimated $1billion in fees and raised $190 billion of debt and equity financing for its telecom clients.  JackGrubman, Citigroup’s main telecom analyst, played a key role in arranging financing and mergerdeals for many of the most aggressive firms in the telecom industry.  Citigroup rewarded seniorexecutives of its clients by allowing them to buy underpriced shares in IPOs underwritten byCitigroup.  Grubman was also one of the most bullish cheerleaders for the telecom industry in hisreports for investors.  Ten large companies that Grubman advised and recommended to investors– including Global Crossing, Winstar and WorldCom – filed for bankruptcy by mid-2002. 
16  For discussion of the claims described in the preceding three paragraphs, see, e.g.,Charles Gasparino, “New York Sues Telecom Executives over Stock Profits,” Wall StreetJournal, Oct. 1, 2002, at A1; Paula Dwyer et al., “Merrill Lynch: See No Evil?”, Business Week,Sept. 15, 2002, at 68; Steve Rosenbush et al., “Inside the Telecom Game,” Business Week, Aug.5, 2002, at 34; Emily Thornton et al., “Crisis at Citi,” Business Week, Sept. 9, 2002, at 35;Wilmarth, “Systemic Risk,” supra note 11, Part III(C); Senate Private-Sector Watchdog Report,supra note 15, at 84-85. 18
Grubman failed to give timely warnings to investors about the grave problems confronting thesefirms, despite the knowledge he reportedly gained through his close ties to senior management.    •       In May 2001, Citigroup and Chase acted as lead underwriters for an $11.8 billionpublic bond offering by WorldCom.  That offering enabled WorldCom to pay off outstandingloans owed to Citigroup, Chase and other banks.  The offering also allowed WorldCom to satisfyits working capital needs in 2001 without requesting additional bank loans.  WorldCom suddenlydefaulted on its bonds and filed for bankruptcy in 2002, while disclosing that it had overstated itsprofits by more than $7 billion since 1998.  Bondholders alleged that (i) the self-interest ofCitigroup and Chase as leading lenders to WorldCom conflicted with their duties as underwriters,and (ii) the banks failed to act with due diligence in ensuring that WorldCom’s financialstatements were accurate when WorldCom made its bond offering.16•       Credit Suisse, Merrill Lynch and other major financial institutions allegedly adoptedpromotion and compensation policies that pressured their securities analysts to issue strongrecommendations in favor of existing or potential investment banking clients, without regard tothe clients’ actual financial condition or prospects.  In addition, Credit Suisse and GoldmanSachs reportedly allocated underpriced shares in IPOs to executives of clients and venture capital
17  Susanne Craig, “Massachusetts Claims CSFB Stock Reports Led Investors Astray,”Wall Street Journal, Oct. 22, 2002, at C1; Burton Malkiel, “Remaking the Market: The GreatWall Street?”, Wall Street Journal, Oct. 14, 2002, at A16; Gretchen Morgenson, “Market Place:Documents Suggest Credit Suisse Linked Banking and Stock Ratings,” New York Times, Oct. 8,2002, at C1; Randall Smith, “Goldman Gave Hot IPO Shares to Top Executives of Its Clients,”Wall Street Journal, Oct. 3, 2002, at A1; Randall Smith et al., “Something Ventured andSomething Gained?”, Wall Street Journal, Oct. 17, 2002, at C1; Ben White, “CSFB E-Mails LinkIPO Shares, Banking Business,” Washington Post, Oct. 22, 2002, at E1; “Face value: Ex-friendsof Frank,” Economist, Sept. 28, 2002, at 62; Senate Private-Sector Watchdog Report, supra note15, at 80-89.
18  E.g., Gretchen Morgenson, “Banks Are Havens (And Other Myths),” New YorkTimes, July 28, 2002, § 3 (Money & Bus.), at 1; Jathon Sapsford & Paul Beckett, “Loss Leader:Linking of Loans to Other Business Has Perils for Banks,” Wall Street Journal, Sept. 19, 2002, atA1; Schlesinger, supra note 11; Thornton et al., “Breakdown in Banking,” supra note 7; “FlawedFinancial Giants,” Business Week, Sept. 9, 2002, at 156 (editorial).  19
firms for the purpose of winning investment banking deals.17In sum, critics charged that the entry of large commercial banks into the investmentbanking business in the 1990's had (i) created structural conflicts of interest that impaired theobjectivity of lending decisions, securities underwriting and investment advice, and (ii) promoteda highly competitive, deal-oriented culture that encouraged both banks and Wall Street firms tooffer loans and underwrite securities that were not justified by any reasonable assessment of thelong-term viability of the enterprises being financed.18  Press accounts indicated, for example,that the quest for investment banking fees had produced the following perverse behavior amongbanks: (1) encouraging clients to endorse wildly optimistic business plans that would justifybigger mergers and larger securities offerings, (2) offering loans only to clients that agreed toretain the banks for underwriting or merger advisory services, and (3) threatening to cut offresearch coverage for firms that were former IPO clients but failed to retain the banks for
19  Kathleen Day, “Banks’ Risky Reversal: As Industry Focuses on More ProfitableSecurities Business, ‘Tying’ Loans to Other Transactions Becomes a Hot Topic,” WashingtonPost, Nov. 18, 2001, at H1; Jeffrey A. Eisenach, “The Real Telecom Scandal,” Wall StreetJournal, Sept. 30, 2002, at A16; Rosenbush et al., supra note 16; Jathan Sapsford, “Leading theNews: NASD Probes Issue of Bank ‘Tying’,” Wall Street Journal, Sept. 20, 2002, at A3;Sapsford & Beckett, supra note 18; Randall Smith & Geeta Anand: “Cleaning Up Wall Street:Piper Jaffray Is Fined for Research Threat,” Wall Street Journal, June 26, 2002, at C1;White,supra note 16.
20  Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., “Quarterly Banking Profile,” 2d Qtr. 2002, at 17 (Tbl. IV-C).  Compare Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., “Quarterly Banking Profile,” 4th Qtr. 1998, at 17 (Tbl.IV-C) (showing that 18 banks and thrifts, with combined assets of less than $2 billion, failedduring 1995-98).
21  Matthew Bishop, “Capitalism and its troubles: A survey of international finance,”Economist, May 18, 2002 (following p. 54), at 9-11, 16-18; Vanessa Fuhrmans, “Deutsche BankPosts Quarterly Loss,” Wall Street Journal, Nov. 1, 2002, at A6; Anita Greil & Marcus Walker,“Credit Suisse Expects Large 3rd-Period Loss,” Wall Street Journal, Oct. 3, 2002, at C5; JohnPlender, “After the binge: The financial system has avoided a crisis over mounting debt but it is20
continuing services.19As of October 2002, the stock market slump and economic slowdown in the U.S. andEurope had not yet produced a severe banking crisis.  However, twenty-seven U.S. banks andthrifts, holding combined assets of nearly $7 billion, failed during 1999-2002, a failure rate thatwas significantly higher than the comparable figures for 1995-98.20  In addition, leading U.S. andEuropean financial conglomerates – including ABN-Amro, Allianz-Dresdner, J.P. MorganChase, Commerzbank, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, FleetBoston, Merrill Lynch and MorganStanley – reported steep declines in earnings during 2001-02, due to problems withnonperforming loans, lower demand for investment banking services and large losses on equityinvestments.  Analysts warned that major banks on both continents would probably confrontmuch higher loan default rates if their economies endured a prolonged slump, because businessfirms and consumers were dangerously overburdened with debt.21  Observers also cautioned that 
still not in the clear,” Financial Times (London, U.K.), April 17, 2002, at 14; Marcus Walker,“Allianz Is Saddled with Dresdner’s Woes,” Wall Street Journal, Oct. 14, 2002, at C1; MarcusWalker & Eric Portanger, “Is the Selloff in Europe’s Big Banks Justified?”, Wall Street Journal,Oct. 10, 2002, at C1; Wilmarth, “Systemic Risk,” supra note 11, Part I(A); Wilmarth,“Transformation,” supra note 3, at 378-402; Woodall, supra note 14, at 3-5, 18-28.
22  Patrick Barta, “Signs of Strain: After Long Boom, Weaknesses Appear in HousingMarket,” Wall Street Journal, Oct. 3, 2002, at A1; Shawn Tully, “Is this house worth $1.2million?”, Fortune, Oct. 28, 2002, at 58; “Special Report: House prices: Going through the roof,”Economist, Mar. 30, 2002, at 59. 21
U.S. and European economies were particularly vulnerable to a downturn in their housingmarkets, because consumers were relying heavily on increased home equity values to supporttheir spending habits and offset declining shareholder wealth.22   Some commentators maintained that major banks did not face a significant threat in late2002, because banks had transferred many of the risks of their lending and underwriting activitiesto institutional investors, including insurance companies, mutual funds and pension funds.  It istrue that large banks have used risk management vehicles – including syndicated business loans,securitized consumer loans, financial derivatives and credit derivatives –  to transfer a widevariety of risks to institutional investors.  However, the complex terms and/or proprietary natureof these transactions have made it much harder for regulators and the financial markets toevaluate the true risks and liabilities retained by banks.  In addition, because banks areincreasingly transferring their risks to other investors, analysts have questioned whether bankscurrently have short-term incentives for generating transactional fees that outweigh their long-term reputational interest in making prudent judgments about the creditworthiness of borrowers.  Yet another problem is that the liquidity, market value and enforceability of riskmanagement vehicles have been subject to sudden adverse changes during financial crises of the
23  E.g., Bishop, supra note 21, at 9-13, 16-18; Peter Coy et al., “Where the Risk Went,”Business Week, Oct. 28, 2002, at 98; Kaufman, On Money and Markets, supra note 1, at 46-83,122-35, 287-321, 327-49; Thornton et al., “Breakdown in Banking,” supra note 7, at 41-42;Heather Timmons, “Everybody Out of the Risk Pool?”, Business Week, Sept. 2, 2002, at 86;Wilmarth, “Transformation,” supra note 3, at 316-407, 454-75.  FRB Chairman Alan Greenspan has praised financial derivatives, credit derivatives,securitization and other risk management vehicles for accomplishing a beneficial “dispersion ofrisk” from banks to nonbank investors.  See “World Finance and Risk Management,” remarks byChairman Greenspan at Lancaster House, London, U.K., Sept. 25, 2002, at 2-4 (available at<www.federalreserve.gov>).  However, it is worth recalling that the FRB did not recognize therisks posed to global financial markets by Long-Term Capital Management (“LTCM”), a hedgefund which held massive and highly speculative investments in financial derivatives, until LTCMinformed the FRB that it was about to collapse in 1998.  Indeed, Chairman Greenspan hadreassured Congress, shortly before the LTCM crisis began, that bank derivatives dealers wereapplying effective credit discipline to their hedge fund counterparties.  See Wilmarth,“Transformation,” supra note 3, at 346-50, 358-59, 370-72.  22
1980's and 1990's.  During those disruptions, many syndications, securitizations and derivativesfailed to perform as anticipated, because (i) their liquidity and market values were impaired bythe actual or threatened default of either banks or their counterparties, or (ii) counterpartieschallenged the ability of banks to enforce these arrangements because of alleged violations ofdisclosure duties or other legal obligations.  As a consequence, some observers have argued that major banks confront serious risks that are not accurately reflected on their financial statementsand also are not adequately controlled by capital rules or other supervisory requirements.23II. Financial Liberalization and the Great Depression of 1929-33A. The Expansion of Bank Involvement in the Real Estate and SecuritiesMarkets after World War IPrior to 1900, national banks were prohibited from making real estate loans and were also
24  H. Parker Willis & John M. Chapman, The Banking Situation 199, 536 (ColumbiaUniv. Press, 1934); W. Nelson Peach, The Securities Affiliates of National Banks 38-51 (JohnHopkins Univ. Press, 1941). 
25  C. D. Bremer, American Bank Failures 97 (Columbia Univ. Press, 1935); Willis &Chapman, supra note 24, at 199, 585-89. 23
largely barred from underwriting, dealing or investing in securities.24  In response to changingcompetitive conditions, federal authorities granted significantly broader powers to national banksduring the first three decades of the twentieth century.  The Federal Reserve Act of 1913permitted national banks headquartered in small cities and rural areas to make loans secured byfarm land.  In 1916, Congress authorized all national banks to make loans secured by any type ofreal estate with terms of up to one year.  The McFadden Act of 1927 allowed all national banksto make real estate loans with terms of up to five years, provided such loans did not exceed 25%of a bank’s capital and surplus or 50% of its time deposits.25In the early 1900's, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”) informallyallowed national banks to establish bond departments, which could underwrite, sell and invest indebt securities issued by federal, state and local governments and corporations.  The McFaddenAct of 1927 ratified the legality of the OCC’s policy on bond departments.  The McFadden Actdid not authorize national banks to underwrite, sell or invest in corporate stocks.  However, as apractical matter, this omission did not significantly restrain the securities activities of nationalbanks.  Since 1908, national banks had circumvented statutory restrictions by organizingaffiliated corporations, which engaged in a full range of underwriting, selling and dealingactivities involving both bonds and stocks.  Prior to the Great Depression, federal authorities did
26  Peach, supra note 24, at 39-43, 50-70; Willis & Chapman, supra note 24, at 176-87,536-37.  In 1911, the Solicitor General of the United States submitted an opinion to the AttorneyGeneral declaring that securities affiliates were illegal under the National Bank Act.  However,the Attorney General did not take action based on the Solicitor General’s opinion.  Similarly,Congress and the OCC did not take any formal steps to restrict the activities of securitiesaffiliates of national banks until the Great Depression occurred.  See Peach, supra note 24, at143-51; Edwin J. Perkins, “The Divorce of Commercial and Investment Banking: A History,” 88Banking Law Journal 483, 488-96 (1971).
27  Bremer, supra note 25, at 121-22; Harold van B. Cleveland & Thomas F. Huertas,Citibank, 1812-1970, at 127-28, 140-53 (Harvard Univ. Press, 1985); Raymond W. Goldsmith[Goldschmidt], The Changing Structure of American Banking 55, 60-67, 72-98, 130-45 (GeorgeRoutledge & Sons, Ltd., 1933); Peach, supra note 24, at 22-31, 150; Willis & Chapman, supranote 24, at 192-93, 199-200, 527-32, 546-62, 610-21.24
not interfere with these securities affiliates.26Federal authorities expanded the real estate lending and securities powers of nationalbanks because they wanted national banks to compete more successfully with state-charteredbanks and trust companies (which enjoyed similar or greater powers under state law).  Bothnational banks and state banks had strong incentives to enter the real estate and securities marketsafter World War I.  Commercial banks had been the primary providers of credit to largecorporations before 1920.  During the 1920's, however, major corporations greatly reduced theirborrowing from banks and instead turned to the securities markets for most of their externalfinancing.  Commercial banks saw the real estate and securities markets as attractive new profitsources to offset the decline in their traditional corporate lending business.27  Federal officials also liberalized the deposit-taking powers for national banks to givethem greater parity with state banks.  Prior to 1900, national banks could accept only depositsthat could be withdrawn on demand.  In 1903, the OCC began allowing national banks to accepttime (savings) deposits so that national banks could compete more effectively with state-
28  Bremer, supra note 25, at 97-98; Willis & Chapman, supra note 24, at 180-81.
29  Willis & Chapman, supra note 24, at 244 (Tbl. 48) (showing that time deposits atnational banks grew from $2.8 billion to $8.1 billion during 1919-29); Goldsmith, supra note 27,at 41-43 (providing data from member bank deposits).
30  Cleveland & Huertas, supra note 27, at 119-20; Goldsmith, supra note 27, at 77; Willis& Chapman, supra note 24, at 180-81, 193, 199.25
chartered commercial banks and mutual savings banks.  The Federal Reserve Act of 1913expressly authorized national banks and state banks that were members of the Federal ReserveSystem to accept time deposits.  The Act (as amended in 1917) also made time deposits a very attractive funding source for member banks, because it prescribed reserve requirements for timedeposits that were much lower than the reserve requirements applicable to demand deposits.28 Time deposits in national banks almost tripled during 1919-29, and time deposits increased from34% of total member bank deposits in 1921 to 46% of such deposits in 1931.29  The longermaturities and higher yields for time deposits encouraged banks to invest those deposits inlonger-term and less liquid assets that had a higher perceived potential for earnings, such as realestate loans, loans on securities, and investments in corporate and foreign securities.30In sum, the liberalization of bank powers after 1900 was fueled by (i) competition forbank charters between federal and state authorities, and (ii) rivalry between the banking andsecurities industries.  Commercial banks rapidly expanded their presence in the real estate andsecurities markets after 1918.  Commercial banks more than tripled their real estate loansbetween World War I and the Great Depression.  During the same period, national banks’ realestate loans grew by a factor of ten.  Most of this increase in real estate lending occurred in urbanmarkets, which enjoyed boom conditions during most of the 1920's.  In contrast, bank loans
31  See Goldsmith, supra note 27, at 72-78, 293 (Tbl. 6) (stating that real estate loansmade by all commercial banks increased from $1.4 billion to $5.0 billion during 1919-29); Willis& Chapman, supra note 24, at 552 (Tbl. 118), 558-59, 591-602 (reporting that real estate loansmade by national banks increased from $150 million to $1.6 billion during 1915-32).
32  Goldsmith, supra note 27, at 86-87, 293 (Tbl. 6).
33  Bremer, supra note 25, at 115-16 (including Tbl. 26); James S. Olson, SavingCapitalism: The Reconstruction Finance Corporation and the New Deal, 1933-1940, at 5(Princeton Univ. Press, 1988); Willis & Chapman, supra note 24, at 535, 546-47.26
secured by farm land showed very little growth after 1920, due to the agricultural economy’sslump after World War I.31             During the 1920's, commercial banks greatly expanded three types of securities-relatedactivities.  First, bank loans on securities grew from $5.2 billion to  $13.0 billion during 1919-30,with the consequence that loans on securities rose from 24% to 38% of total bank loans duringthat period.32   Second, banks greatly increased their investments in more risky, higher-yieldingsecurities and shifted away from safer, lower-yielding U.S. government bonds.  The totalsecurities investments of commercial banks grew from $8.4 billion to $13.7 billion during 1921-30.  Four-fifths of this growth represented additional investments in state and municipal bonds,corporate bonds and foreign securities.  As a result, the percentage of U.S. government bondsheld in the securities portfolios of commercial banks declined from 35% to 26%.33 Third, commercial banks greatly expanded their involvement in securities underwritingduring the 1920's, and they reached competitive parity with investment banks by the end of thedecade.  The number of commercial banks engaged in securities underwriting through bonddepartments or securities affiliates more than doubled, rising from 277 in 1922 to 591 in 1929. Banks and their affiliates originated 22% and participated in 37% of all bond issues in 1927.  By
34  Peach, supra note 24, at 83 (Tbl. I), 109 (Tbl. III), 110 (Tbl. IV).  See also Vincent P.Carosso, Investment Banking in America: A History 279 (Harvard Univ. Press, 1970) (statingthat, by 1929, banks and their securities affiliates were “equal in importance to all investmentbankers in the distribution of long-term capital and in the facilities and value of their [securitiesunderwriting] business”).
35  Cleveland & Huertas, supra note 27, at 139, 140 (Tbl. 8.1), 152-53, 385 n.15;Goldsmith, supra note 27, at 137; Peach, supra note 24, at 86-97.
36  Goldsmith, supra note 27, at 293 (Tbl. 6).27
1929, banks and their affiliates originated 45% and participated in 51% of all bond issues.34      The leading bank securities affiliate was National City Company (“NCC”), which wasestablished in 1911 by National City Bank (“NCB”).   By 1929, NCC had built the world’slargest securities distribution network, which included more than fifty U.S. offices and salesrepresentatives working in NCB’s eighty-nine foreign branches.  NCC’s market power wasdemonstrated by (i) its origination or participation in offerings for a fifth of all domestic andforeign bonds issued in the United States during 1921-29, and (ii) its status as the largestdistributor of domestic and foreign bonds issued in the United States during 1927-31.  ChaseNational Bank (“Chase”) established the second largest securities affiliate, Chase SecuritiesCorp. (“CSC”).  By acquiring Harris Forbes & Co. in 1930, CSC built a selling network that alsoincluded more than fifty domestic offices and numerous foreign locations.35Large-scale entry by commercial banks into the real estate and securities markets caused adramatic change in their balance sheets.  Real estate loans and loans on securities accounted foronly 30% of commercial bank loans in 1919 but rose to half of such loans in 1929.36  Aspreviously noted, the investment portfolios of commercial banks grew by more than $5 billionduring the 1920's, and four-fifths of this growth was concentrated in higher-risk and less liquid
37  See supra note 33 and accompanying text (discussing changes in investment portfoliosof commercial banks during the 1920's); Goldsmith, supra note 27, at 298 (Tbl. 12) (showing thatnational banks’ investments in corporate, foreign, state and local securities rose from $1.5 billionto $3.6 billion during 1919-30, while their holdings of U.S. government bonds declined from$3.2 billion to $2.8 billion). 
38  Olson, supra note 33, at 5. 28
securities.37  While the primary assets of commercial banks in 1918 had been short-term, self-liquidating commercial paper and U.S. government securities, by 1929 the principal assets ofcommercial banks were “loans and investments whose liquidity depended on general capitalvalues” in the securities and real estate markets.38  The heavy reliance of banks on the health ofthe real estate and securities markets proved to be disastrous during the Great Depression.B. The Impact of Financial Liberalization on the Asset Boom of the 1920's andthe Banking Crisis of 1930-33Senator Carter Glass, Representative Henry Steagall and other proponents of the G-S Actwere convinced that banks had played a significant role in promoting unsustainable booms in thereal estate and securities markets during the 1920's.  As adherents of the “real bills doctrine,”Glass and his principal banking advisor, Professor H. Parker Willis, maintained that commercialbanks should restrict their operations to the acceptance of demand deposits and the extension ofshort-term, self-liquidating loans to finance the production and sale of goods by business firms. Glass and Willis believed that these restraints on commercial bank activities would (i) maintain abasic equilibrium between prudent bank lending and legitimate business needs for credit, and (ii)prevent banks from financing illiquid and speculative investments that were likely to produce a
39  Peach, supra note 24, at 9-15, 151-61, 169, 177; Perkins, supra note 26, at 497-505,517-25.
40  Peach, supra note 24, at 12, 151-54; Perkins, supra note 26, at 497-505.  See also, e.g.,75 Congressional Record (“Cong. Rec.”) 9883-85 (1932) (remarks of Sen. Glass, arguing that theFederal Reserve System had failed to carry out the purposes of the Federal Reserve Act); 77Cong. Rec. 3725 (1933) (remarks of Sen. Glass, declaring that the “main purpose” of his bill“was to prevent . . . the use of Federal Reserve facilities for stock-gambling purposes”); id. at3835 (remarks of Rep. Steagall, stating that the bill would “call back to the service of agricultureand commerce and industry the bank credit and the bank service designed by the framers of theFederal Reserve Act,” and would prevent banks from engaging in “speculation, in stockgambling, and in aid of wild and reckless international high finance”).
41  Senate Report No. 77, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933) [hereinafter cited as 1933 SenateReport], at 3, 7. 29
boom-and-bust cycle in the general economy.39   As one of the principal architects of the Federal Reserve System, Glass believed that theFederal Reserve Banks should (i) provide appropriate liquidity services to member banks bydiscounting short-term commercial paper, and (ii) discourage speculative activities by memberbanks, including loans or investments that facilitated “stock gambling.”  By 1931, Glass andWillis concluded that the Federal Reserve System had failed to provide the liquidity needed bybanks and had also been derelict in restraining speculative activities by banks.  Glass and Willistherefore pushed for legislation that would prevent member banks from using the FederalReserve discount window for speculative purposes, and would also separate commercial banksfrom the investment banking business.40  In advocating such legislation, Glass, Steagall and theirsupporters argued that (1) banks had made unsound loans and investments that encouraged an“overbuilt” real estate market and an “immense over-expansion of real estate values,”41 (2) bankshad made imprudent investments in securities that undermined their solvency after the stock
42  Id. at 6-7, 8, 11, 16; 77 Cong. Rec. 3835 (1933) (remarks of Rep. Steagall).   
43  1933 Senate Report, supra note 41, at 3-4, 6-7, 8-10, 16-18; 75 Cong. Rec. 9883-85(1932) (remarks of Sen. Glass); id. at 9904-06 (remarks of Sen. Walcott); id. at 9909-13 (remarksof Sen. Bulkley); 77 Cong. Rec. 3835-36 (1933) (remarks of Rep. Steagall); id. at 3907 (remarksof Rep. Kopplemann).
44  E.g., George J. Benston, The Separation of Commercial and Investment Banking: TheGlass-Steagall Act Revisited and Reconsidered (Oxford Univ. Press, 1990); Jonathan R. Macey,“Special Interest Groups Legislation and the Judicial Function: The Dilemma of Glass-Steagall,”33 Emory Law Journal 1 (1984); Eugene N. White, “Before the Glass-Steagall Act: An Analysisof the Investment Banking Activities of National Banks,” 23 Explorations in Economic History33 (1986) [hereinafter cited as White, “Glass-Steagall”].
45  Senate Report No. 106-44, at 3-6 (1999).  See also H.R. Report No. 106-74 (Part 1), at97-98 (1999). 30
market crashed,42 and (3) banks had made excessive loans to finance the purchase of securities,and their affiliates had underwritten too many unsound and speculative issues, therebycontributing to the “overinvestment” in securities that jeopardized banks, investors and thegeneral economy.43 Beginning in the 1980's, several prominent scholars challenged the factual premises andpolicy justifications for the G-S Act.44  In adopting the GLB Act in 1999, Congress determinedthat the G-S Act’s constraints on affiliations between banks and securities firms had become“unsuitable and outdated.”45  A comprehensive analysis of the merits and shortcomings of the G-S Act is beyond the scope of this article.  I plan to address that topic in a future work.  For present purposes, I wish to make three points.  First, bank involvement in the realestate and securities markets during the 1920's was associated with unsustainable asset booms inboth markets.  Second, excessive exposure to real estate loans, loans on securities and investmentsecurities was a major factor in many bank failures during the 1930's.  Third, many of the largest
46  Lester V. Chandler, America’s Greatest Depression, 1929-41, at 16-17 (Harper & RowPublishers, 1970); Goldsmith, supra note 27, at 77-79, 105, 296 (Tbl. 10); Willis & Chapman,supra note 24, at 587-600, 608; 1933 Senate Report, supra note , at 3, 7.31
and most devastating bank failures during the 1930's involved institutions that were heavilyinvolved in either the real estate market or the securities market or both.  These large bankfailures had severe macroeconomic effects that compelled the federal government to undertake amassive recapitalization program through the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (“RFC”) and acomprehensive deposit insurance program through the FDIC.                       1.         The contribution of banks to boom conditions in the real estate andsecurities markets.  The involvement of banks in the real estate and securities markets helped toproduce spectacular booms in both sectors during the 1920's.  Commercial banks more thantripled their real estate lending during the 1920's, and securities affiliates of banks also competedwith investment banks in issuing mortgage bonds to investors.  By 1929, outstanding debtssecured by real estate included $37 billion of urban mortgages and some $6-$8 billion ofmortgage bonds.  Commercial banks held more than 10% of these obligations as assets on theirbalance sheets. Due to this massive influx of real estate financing, the volume of newconstruction activity rose from less than $4 billion in 1921 to more than $54 billion during 1922-28.  Nearly $35 billion was invested in building new homes during the 1920's, and manyapartments, hotels and office buildings were also constructed.  Analysts concluded that manyurban real estate markets had become “overbuilt” and highly speculative by 1929.46  The boom in the securities markets was even more remarkable.  Annual offerings of debtand equity securities by U.S. corporations nearly tripled, rising from $2.8 billion in 1920 to anaverage of $7.6 billion during 1927-29.  Annual offerings of foreign stocks and bonds more than
47  Carosso, supra note 34, at 243 (Exh. 7), 244 (Exh. 8); Ilse Mintz, Deterioration in theQuality of Foreign Bonds Issued in the United States, 1920-30 (Nat’l Bur. of Econ. Res. 1951), at9 (Tbl. 1). 
48  Chancellor, supra note 5, at 191-213; J.T.W. Hubbard, For Each, the Strength of All: AHistory of Banking in the State of New York 190-96 (New York Univ. Press, 1995); Shiller,supra note 15, at 8-9, 103-07.
49  See, e.g., John K. Galbraith, The Great Crash, 1929, at 12-92 (Houghton Mifflin Co.,3d ed. 1972); J. Bradford De Long & Andrei Shleifer, “The Stock Market Bubble of 1929:Evidence from Closed-end Mutual Funds,” 51 Journal of Economic History 675 (1991); EugeneN. White, “The Stock Market Boom and Crash of 1929 Revisited,” 4 Journal of EconomicPerspectives No. 2, Spring 1990, at 67. 32
doubled, growing from $600 million in 1920 to an average of $1.4 billion during 1924-28.  Thenumber of shares traded annually on the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) more thanquadrupled, increasing from 230 million in 1920 to 1 billion in 1928-29.47  Based on awidespread belief among investors that the U.S. economy had entered a “new era” of permanenteconomic growth, the Dow Jones Industrial Average (“DJIA”) skyrocketed from 64 in August1921 to 382 in September 1929.  The price-earnings ratio for the S&P Composite Index of stocksmultiplied by a factor of six during the 1920's and reached 32.6 in September 1929, a record thatlasted until the peak of the bull market in early 2000.48  Several scholars have concluded that the stock market boom produced a speculative“bubble” during its final, frenzied stage in 1928-29.49  Those are the same two years duringwhich (i) commercial banks and their affiliates accomplished the most spectacular growth in theirsecurities underwriting and retail selling activities, and (ii) securities firms responded byorganizing and selling units in hundreds of investment trusts (similar to today’s mutual funds) to
50  Carosso, supra note 34, at 278-99; Galbraith, supra note 49, at 49-70; Goldsmith, supranote 27, at 130-46; Peach, supra note 24, at 89-110; 75 Congressional Record 9910, 9913 (1932)(remarks of Sen. Bulkley).
51  Chandler, supra note 46, at 8-9, 15-17, 73; Goldsmith, supra note 27, at 61-64, 72-77;Martha L. Olney, “Avoiding Default: The Role of Credit in the Consumption Collapse of 1930,”114 Quarterly Journal of Economics 319, 320-23 (1999).
52  Barrie Wigmore, The Crash and Its Aftermath: A History of the Securities Markets inthe United States, 1929-1933, at 27 (Greenwood Press, 1985).  See also Goldsmith, supra note27, at 297 (Tbl. 11).
53  Carosso, supra note 34, at 243 (Exh. 7); Chandler, supra note 46, at 8 (Tbl. 1-5).33
small investors.50     Speculative activities during the 1920's produced a rapid buildup of consumer andbusiness debt, which left the U.S. economy in a highly leveraged state on the eve of the GreatDepression. Mortgage loans and bonds on urban real estate quadrupled to almost $40 billion by1929, with half of that amount owed by homeowners.  Consumer non-mortgage debt more thandoubled to $7.6 billion, as merchants encouraged consumers to buy cars, household appliancesand other durable goods on installment credit.  Banks financed a significant portion of thisgrowth in consumer credit by purchasing installment paper from merchant creditors.51  Banksalso provided most of the loans on securities, including broker call loans.  During the 1920's,loans on securities more than doubled to $16 billion, which “represented 18% of the value of alllisted stocks [in 1929], an enormous proportion to be held on credit.”52  U.S. corporations issuednearly $30 billion of bonds during the 1920's, increasing their total indebtedness to almost $90billion by 1929.53  Debt service relative to GDP reached 9% for the United States in 1929,compared to only 3.9% for Canada.  This high degree of leverage in the U.S. economy – whichwas spurred by rosy expectations of continued economic growth –  exposed consumers, business
54  Ben S. Bernanke, “Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the Propagation ofthe Great Depression,” 73 American Economic Review 257 (1983) [hereinafter cited asBernanke, “Nonmonetary Effects”], at 260-66; Charles W. Calomiris, “Financial Factors in theGreat Depression,” 7 Journal of Economic Perspectives No. 2, Spring 1993, at 61, 73-77;Chancellor, supra note 5, at 191-99, 207-11; Eugene N. White, “Banking and Finance in theTwentieth Century,” in Stanley L. Engerman & Robert E. Gallman, eds., Economic History ofthe United States (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2000), Vol. III, at 693, 752-63.
55  Chandler, supra note 46, at 73; Goldsmith, supra note 27, at 79-84; Elmus Wicker, TheBanking Panics of the Great Depression 16 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1996); Wigmore, supra note52, at 228-29, 308, 317, 430-31; Willis & Chapman, supra note 24, at 126 (Tbl. 1), 598 (Tbl.139), 599-609.  See also Mintz, supra note 47, at 46-48 (describing R. J. Saulnier’s study ofurban mortgage lending by life insurance companies, which found that, by the end of 1934,lenders had foreclosed on 24% of mortgages made during 1920-24 and 41% of mortgages madeduring 1925-29). 34
firms, banks and institutional investors to devastating financial shocks during the GreatDepression.54   2.         Bank failures resulting from exposure to the real estate and securitiesmarkets.  Losses from real estate loans and securities investments were major causes of bankfailures during 1930-33.  Default rates rose rapidly for both residential and commercialmortgages and reached crisis proportions by 1931-32.  Real estate values in many urban areas fellby 25-40% during 1929-31, and a large number of urban real estate markets were essentially“frozen” by 1932.  Banks often could not liquidate nonperforming loans by foreclosing on them,because no buyers were available to pay any reasonable price for the underlying property.  Fornational banks, real estate loans as a percentage of capital and surplus rose from 24% in 1926 to44% in 1930 and 57% in 1932.  During 1930-32, the capital funds of national banks declinedfrom $3.9 billion to $3.1 billion.  The illiquid status of defaulted real estate loans was evidently asignificant factor explaining the loss of bank capital during the early 1930's.55  Moreover, asdescribed in the next section, several of the largest clusters of bank failures occurred in urban
56  Goldsmith, supra note 27, at 103-07; Mintz, supra note 47, at 8-11, 29-43, 51-52; Wigmore, supra note 52, at 287-293, 302-05, 394-417.
57  Willis & Chapman, supra note 24, at 537-40 (describing study of 34 failed New Yorkstate banks); Robert G. Rodkey, “State Bank Failures in Michigan,” 7 Michigan Business Studies101, 101-02, 130-39 (1935-36) (presenting study of 163 failed Michigan state banks).
58  Wicker, supra note 55, at 13-14 (showing that, during 1929-32, member banks lost$6.84 for every $100 of investments, compared to $5.09 for every $100 of loans); Goldsmith,supra note 27, at 302 (Tbl. 16) (reporting that member banks reported $470 million of losses onsecurities during 1929-31, compared to $630 million of losses on loans).35
areas that had the heaviest concentrations of bank real estate loans and investments.Many banks were also devastated by depreciation in their securities portfolios.  Themarket values of corporate and foreign bonds with less than an “A” rating fell sharply during1930-32.  Investor losses on South American and Eastern European bonds were especiallysevere, because three-quarters of those bonds defaulted during the 1930's.56  One analysis ofclosed New York state banks found that their securities portfolios had suffered an average loss inmarket value of 37.5%.  Similarly, a study of closed Michigan state banks determined thatdepreciation in their bond portfolios (especially with regard to real estate bonds) was a primaryreason for their failure.57  During 1929-32, the percentage losses suffered by national and statemember banks on their securities investments exceeded their percentage losses on loans.58  Smaller country banks suffered the greatest percentage losses, because they had generallyinvested a larger share of their funds in higher-risk securities.  Some commentators blamedcountry bankers for their imprudence in pursuing higher yields without regard to risk.  However,members of Congress and other observers condemned securities firms and securities affiliates of 
59  Milton Friedman & Anna J. Schwartz, A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960, at 312-13, 319, 355-57 (Princeton Univ. Press, 1963); Goldsmith, supra note 27, at 105-07,190-91; Mintz, supra note 47, at 63-86; Wicker, supra note 55, at 13-15; Wigmore, supra note52, at 291-93, 322-23, 394-95.  See also, e.g., 75 Cong. Rec. 9883 (1932) (remarks of Sen. Glass,claiming that “the great banks in the money centers choked the portfolios of their correspondentbanks from Maine to California with utterly worthless investment securities”); 77 Cong. Rec.4416 (1933) (remarks of Sen. Wheeler, citing a Montana bank that failed after suffering defaultson bonds it bought from New York banks).
60  Cleveland & Huertas, supra note 27, at 159-61, 171, 191, 390 n.44, 391-92 n.4. 36
banks for encouraging unsophisticated country bankers to buy high-risk securities.59Securities affiliates of banks did not escape the carnage.  For example, the affiliates ofNCB and Chase produced major losses for themselves and their sister banks.  After makingprofits of $25 million during 1925-29, NCC incurred net losses of more than $100 million during1930-33, including heavy losses on its equity investments. For its part, NCB held (i) $80 millionof frozen “bridge loans” extended to NCC’s customers in expectation of bond offerings that werenever completed, and (ii) several million dollars of unpaid loans obtained by NCB’s officers forthe purpose of buying NCB’s stock.  NCB recorded total losses of $170 million during 1930-34,amounting to two-thirds of its shareholders’ equity at the end of 1929.60Similarly, CSC wrote down its capital by $80 million during 1930-33, reflecting heavylosses on its equity investments.  Chase’s losses for 1930-34 exceeded $130 million, reducing itsbook value per share by 54% since the end of 1929.  More than half of Chase’s losses resultedfrom (i) loans made to the Republic of Cuba to support of CSC’s Cuban underwriting activities,and (ii) loans and equity investments supporting General Theatres Equipment, a bankruptcompany that had been a major client of CSC.  The boards of directors of NCB and Chasedismissed the executives (Charles Mitchell and Albert Wiggin) who had led the banks into the
61  Carosso, supra note 34, at 329-35, 346-48; Cleveland & Huertas, supra note 27, at 172-88, 197-98; Goldsmith, supra note 27, at 139-42; Peach, supra note 24, at 113-39, 157-65;Wigmore, supra note 52, at 121, 173-75, 220-21, 238, 357-60, 468, 469 (Tbl. 14-6) (showingthat, in 1933, the stock prices of Chase and NCB fell to 6% and 3% of their 1929 peak values).
62  Goldsmith, supra note 27, at 225-26; John B. McFerrin, Caldwell and Company: ASouthern Financial Empire passim (Vanderbilt Univ. Press reprint, 1969); Wicker, supra note 55,at 32-36, 43-59. 37
securities business, and both banks liquidated their securities affiliates in 1934.  NCB and Chasesurvived the Great Depression, even though they suffered tremendous reputational damage andtheir stock prices declined more than most of their peer institutions.61  As discussed in the nextsection, many of their regional competitors did not fare so well. 3. Major bank failures related to real estate and securities activities.A comprehensive discussion of bank failures during the 1930's is beyond the scope of thisarticle.  However, the following failures or near-failures of major banking organizations can betied to their heavy involvement in the real estate and/or securities markets: • Caldwell and Co. (“CAC”) established a large financial and industrial empire thatincluded (i) a securities firm that underwrote municipal bonds, real estate bonds and industrialrevenue bonds throughout the South, (ii) the largest chain of banks and the largest insurancegroup in the South, with combined assets of nearly $450 million, and (iii) newspapers andindustrial companies.  In early 1930, CAC merged with BancoKentucky Co., which controlled achain of banks with total assets of $130 million.  The entire structure was financially unsoundand collapsed in November 1930.  CAC’s demise precipitated the failures of more than 130banks and inflicted a severe economic shock on several Southern states (including Arkansas,Kentucky, North Carolina and Tennessee).62     
63  Friedman & Schwartz, supra note 59, at 308-12; Goldsmith, supra note 27, at 227-28;Joseph L. Lucia, “The Failure of the Bank of United States: A Reappraisal,” 22 Explorations inEconomic History 402 (1985); Paul B. Trescott, “The Failure of the Bank of United States,1930,” 24 Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 384 (1992); Wicker, supr anote 55, at 36-59;Wigmore, supra note 52, at 223-28.   38
• Bank of United States (“BUS”), a large New York City bank with over $200million of assets, failed in December 1930.  BUS expanded rapidly during the 1920's bypurchasing five other banks, and it also established a large network of real estate and securitiesaffiliates.  BUS and its real estate affiliates made large loans to real estate developers andinvested in real estate bonds.  BUS also made substantial loans to its officers and securitiesaffiliates to finance trading in BUS’ stock.  BUS was determined to support its stock pricebecause of price guarantees it had issued to many shareholders.  BUS failed when the real estateand stock markets slumped in 1930.  While there has been scholarly debate over themacroeconomic effects of BUS’ failure, BUS’ demise probably had a significant adverse impacton public confidence in banks.  A small New York bank and a medium-sized Philadelphia bankfailed shortly thereafter, and the New York Clearing House was forced to defend ManufacturersTrust against a potential depositor run.63                                • In 1931 banking panics occurred in Chicago, Pittsburgh, Philadelphia and several cities in the Cleveland district (including Akron, Toledo and Youngstown).  Most ofthese failures occurred because of the banks’ heavy exposure to defaulted real estate loans anddepreciated real estate bonds.  Each panic was brought to an end by collective action (includingforced mergers) organized by the leading banks in each community.  For example, the FirstNational Bank of Chicago acquired Foreman State Bank and two other threatened Chicago bankswere merged together to form Central Republic Bank.  Similarly, the New York Clearing House
64  Goldsmith, supra note 27, at 81-84, 158-59, 163-64, 227-32; F. Cyril James, TheGrowth of Chicago Banks (Harper & Bros., 1938), Vol. II, at 992-1006; Wicker, supra note 55, at62-104; Wigmore, supra note 52, at 218-21.
65  Goldsmith, supra note 27, at 91, 151 n.1, 175-76, 195-200; James, supra note 64, at1030-41; Marquis James & Bessie R. James, Biography of a Bank: The Story of Bank ofAmerica 313-17, 337-38, 350-54 (Harper & Bros., 1954); Wicker, supra note 55, at 112-14;Wigmore, supra note 52, at 152-54, 247, 321, 344-48, 353-54, 360.39
helped Manufacturers Trust to acquire the Chatham Phenix Bank and several smaller New YorkCity banks.64• In 1932, a full-scale banking panic broke out in Chicago.  Central Republic Bankwas faced with imminent failure after the Insull utility empire collapsed, because half ofCentral’s capital was tied up in loans that were collateralized by Insull securities.  Central’sproblems threatened the city’s two largest banks – Continental Illinois and First National – because they had also made extensive loans secured by Insull interests and their securitiesaffiliates had underwritten Insull debentures.  Chicago banks also confronted severe real estatelending problems, as $1 billion of Chicago property was already in foreclosure.  TheReconstruction Finance Corporation (“RFC”) made an emergency loan of $90 million to Central,which enabled Central to transfer its deposits and offices to a newly-chartered bank and liquidateits remaining assets in an orderly manner.  The RFC’s action effectively protected Central’sdepositors and thereby forestalled a likely depositor run on the other big Chicago banks. Similarly, the RFC headed off a threat to Bank of America, the largest bank in California, whichwas heavily burdened with nonperforming real estate loans.  The RFC boosted Bank ofAmerica’s liquidity by lending $90 million to the bank and its affiliated mortgage company.65 • A nationwide banking panic was triggered by the failure of Detroit’s two largest 
66  Goldsmith, supra note 27, at 81-84, 91, 168-70, 235-36, 238 n.2; Olson, supra note 33,at 27-30; Wicker, supra note 55, at 116-29; Wigmore, supra note 55, at 433-45; 77 Cong. Rec.4034-36 (1933) (remarks of Rep. Truax). 40
bank holding companies in February 1933.  Detroit Bankers Corp. (“DBC”) and GuardianDetroit Union Group (“Guardian”) controlled four-fifths of the Detroit area’s banking assets. DBC and Guardian grew rapidly by acquiring numerous banks during the 1920's, and bothcompanies had active securities affiliates.  Both companies and their banks had heavyconcentrations in real estate loans, real estate bonds and loans secured by their own stock.  Thesevere slump in the automotive industry after 1929 devastated the Detroit economy and exposedboth organizations to severe losses.  The RFC tried to rescue Guardian and DBC, but its lendingcapacity was limited by its statutory mandate to obtain good collateral for its loans.  Henry Fordrefused to provide financial support for Guardian, and he threatened to pull his deposits out ofDBC.  Federal and state authorities therefore closed all of DBC’s and Guardian’s banks, and theMichigan governor declared a statewide bank holiday. The Michigan disaster rapidly spread toother states.  For example, the two largest banks in Cleveland collapsed shortly after theMichigan debacle, due largely to their heavy exposure to failed corporate and real estate venturespromoted by the Eaton and Van Sweringen interests.  By early March, nearly every state hadimposed a general moratorium or other restrictions on deposit withdrawals.  Upon his inaugural,President Franklin Roosevelt declared a nationwide bank holiday.66The foregoing bank failures had a severe macroeconomic impact in two respects.  First,bank failures had adverse monetary effects because (i) depositors increasingly converted theirdeposits into currency as major bank failures multiplied after 1930, and (ii) about $7 billion ofbank deposits were frozen in closed or suspended banks by 1933.  Commercial bank deposits
67  E.g., Friedman & Schwartz, supra note 59, at 310-52; Wicker, supra note 55, at 19-23,155-65.
68  E.g., Bernanke, Nonmonetary Effects, supra note 54; Calomiris, supra note 54.
69  E.g., Bernanke, supra note 54; Calomiris, supra note 54; Patrick J. Coe, “FinancialCrisis and the Great Depression: A Regime Switching Approach,” 34 Journal of Money, Creditand Banking 76 (2002); Friedman & Schwartz, supra note 59, at 308-59; Goldsmith, supra note27, at 7-8, 207-35; Wicker, supra note 55, at 5-19.41
declined by over 42%, of $18 billion, during 1929-33, which depressed the nation’s moneysupply.67  Second, bank failures also had serious nonmonetary effects, because they (1) disrupted lender-borrower relationships, (2) discouraged surviving banks from extending loans to smallerfirms, which faced much greater risks to their viability in comparison with large corporations,and (3) encouraged banks and other institutional investors to invest only in U.S. governmentbonds and the securities of the largest and safest corporations.  In short, banks sought to survivethe Great Depression by shifting from loans to safe government securities, bond spreads betweenhighly-rated firms and lower-rated firms grew to unprecedented levels and smaller firms wereessentially shut out of the credit markets.68It is noteworthy that thousands of small rural banks had failed during the 1920's(primarily due to the severe slump in agricultural markets after World War I), but those failuresdid not have a material impact on the national economy.  Most studies have found that severemonetary effects (including currency hoarding) and nonmonetary effects (including widespreadbusiness failures) began with the failures of large banks that commenced in late 1930 andcontinued through the bank holiday of 1933 and the long resolution process that followed.69  Fora variety of reasons, the FRB failed to act effectively as lender of last resort to the bankingsystem in the early 1930's.  By 1933, collective action by banks and loans by the RFC could no
70  The RFC purchased $1.3 billion of preferred stock in 6,800 banks during 1933-34.  By1934, the RFC held stock in half of all U.S. banks, and RFC contributions accounted for one-third of the total equity capital of U.S. banks.  The RFC also made $2 billion in loans to morethan 8,000 open and closed banks during 1932-34.  According to the RFC’s chairman, JesseJones, only 20 of the banks selling preferred stock to the RFC did not need capital assistance. The new federal deposit insurance program effectively prevented further depositor panics andwas the “structural change most conducive to monetary stability” after 1933.  Friedman &Schwartz, supra note 59, at 421-42 (see id. at 427 n.4, as to Jesse Jones’ remark, and id. at 434,440-42, as to the authors’ opinion regarding the benefits of federal deposit insurance).  See alsoCalomiris, supra note 54, at 62-63, 68-75; Joseph R. Mason, “Do Lender of Last Resort PoliciesMatter?  The Effects of Reconstruction Finance Corporation Assistance to Banks During theGreat Depression,” 20 Journal of Financial Services Research 77 (2001) (concluding that RFCloans during 1932 were unsuccessful in preventing bank failures, but the RFC’s efforts were farmore effective after Congress authorized the RFC to purchase preferred stock from banks in1933); Olson, supra note 33, at 69-82 (describing the RFC’s role in restoring the banking systemafter the national bank holiday of 1933); David C. Wheelock, “Monetary Policy in the GreatDepression: What the Fed Did, and Why,” 74 Review No. 2 (Fed. Res. Bank of St. Louis, MO),Mar./April 1992, at 3 (explaining why the FRB failed to provide effective “lender of last resort”assistance to banks during the early 1930's). 42
longer prevent a nationwide banking crisis.  The federal government restored the banking systemand depositor confidence only by (i) recapitalizing banks with RFC purchases of preferred stockand (ii) instituting a national deposit insurance scheme.70
ConclusionInternational banking crises since the 1970's and the U.S. experience during the GreatDepression share a number of common elements.  Financial deregulation typically encouragesbanks to expand their involvement in the securities and real estate markets, and it also intensifiescompetition between banks and nonbank financial intermediaries.  As a result, financialliberalization tends to increase the vulnerability of the banking system to sudden collapses ofasset values in the securities and real estate markets. For these reasons, deregulation has beenassociated with boom-and-bust cycles and banking crises in many countries since the 1970's, and
43
the same was true of the United States during the Great Depression.  Systemic bank crises have serious monetary and nonmonetary impacts on the generaleconomy that are difficult and expensive to overcome.  While government officials oftenproclaim their adherence to “market discipline” before a banking crisis occurs, the experiences ofthe Great Depression and more recent years have convinced most authorities that systemicbanking crises cannot be left to run their course.  The conventional response since the 1970's hasbeen to take the same course which U.S. authorities adopted in 1933 – namely, to recapitalizelarge banks and protect depositors against loss.  Given the virtual certainty of massivegovernmental intervention when systemic banking crises occur, regulators must give greaterattention to the potential long-term economic risks of financial liberalization programs.         
